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COMMENT
The Guiding Hand of Counsel: Effective
Representation for Indigent Defendants in
the Cordele Judicial Circuit
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law.... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he had a perfect one. He requires
the guidinghand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case,
civil or criminal,a state or federal court were arbitrarilyto refuse to
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial
of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional
sense. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

is a
The right to be represented by an attorney at a criminal trial
2
If a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Georgia constitution.
criminal defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney, the state must
provide one.3 Unfortunately, upholding this constitutional mandate has
been challenging in some parts of the state. In January 2014, the

1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
2. GA. CONST. art.1, § 1, para. XIV.
3. Cf. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002)
[hereinafter ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES] ("Since the responsibility to provide defense services

rests with the state, there should be state funding and a statewide structure responsible
for ensuring uniform quality statewide.").
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Southern Center for Human Rights sued a number of defendants on
behalf of indigent plaintiffs in the Cordele Judicial Circuit for a second
time, claiming that the quality of representation that indigent defendants in that circuit receive fails to meet the constitutional guarantee of
assistance of counsel.4 This lawsuit highlights a critical gap in access
to justice for some of the state's poorest citizens.
II. HISTORY
Gideon v.
is the seminal case in American jurisprudence
holding that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to representation
by counsel to ensure they receive a fair trial.6 Gideon was charged with
a felony in Florida, and he requested an attorney when he appeared in
court. He could not afford to hire counsel himself, and he informed the
court that "[tihe United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be
represented by Counsel."7 However, Florida law only allowed the
appointment of counsel when a criminal defendant was charged with a
capital crime, so the trial court denied Gideon's request.8 Gideon
defended himself "about as well as could be expected from a layman."9
Nonetheless, the jury found him guilty, and Gideon received a sentence
of five years in state prison. He filed a petition for habeas corpus,
claiming the refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel to represent him
violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Florida Supreme Court denied relief.'° The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve "the problem
of a defendant's federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court"
by deciding whether Betts v. Brady" should be overturned.12 The
Supreme Court appointed counsel for Gideon for the appeal. 3
The Court began its analysis by noting that the facts of Betts and
Gideon are "strikingly" similar. 4 At his arraignment, Betts had
Wainwright5

4. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, N.P. ex rel. Darden v. Georgia, No.
2014CV241025 (Fulton Cnty. Superior Ct., Jan. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint].
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See id. at 344 ("fn our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.").
7. Id. at 336-37.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 337.
10. Id. at 337 & n.1.
11. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
12. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337-38.
13. Id. at 338.
14. Id.

20151

THE GUIDING HAND OF COUNSEL

783

requested that the judge appoint an attorney for him because he could
not afford one. The court did not comply with this request because, at
the time, that county only appointed counsel for indigent defendants
accused of murder or rape. Betts pled not guilty and defended himself
at his bench trial. The judge found him guilty and sentenced him to
eight years in prison.' 5 Betts filed a petition for habeas corpus, but he
was denied relief by the Maryland Court of Appeals as well as the
16
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held in Betts
"that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with
a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."17 Twenty-one years later in Gideon, the
5
Supreme Court overruled Betts."
In so doing, the Court began its analysis with the Sixth Amendment, 9 which it has construed as giving criminal defendants in federal
courts the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford to engage an
attorney for their defense.2" The Court had declined to extend this
right to criminal defendants in state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment in Betts, basing its decision on "historical data" and concluding
that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a
22
fair trial."2 In Gideon, the Court disagreed with this conclusion.
The Court surveyed a number of prior decisions in which it had held
23
In Powell
that the right to counsel is, in fact, a fundamental right.
24
had
Court
the
Betts,
to
prior
years
ten
decided
was
which
v. Alabama,
fundamental
this
of
is
counsel
of
aid
the
the
to
right
"the
concluded that
character."25 While the Court in Powell had limited its holding to the
facts of that case, in Gideon the Court noted that this check does not
26
change the conclusion that the right to counsel is a fundamental one.
Four years later, the Court reaffirmed this assessment in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.27 when it observed that the Due Process Clause of

15. Id.
16. See id. at 339; Betts, 316 U.S. at 457.
17. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.").
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40.
21. Id. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 471).
22. Id. at 342 ("We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.").
23. Id. at 342-45.
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
26. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343.
27. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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the Fourteenth Amendment 28 protected "the fundamental right of the
accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution" against state
action. 29 Four years after Grosjean, the Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst, °
once again stated that having the assistance of counsel "is one of the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty."31
Observing that the Court in Betts had broken with this long line of
precedent when it held that the assistance of counsel was not a
fundamental right protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Court in Gideon overturned Betts to "restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice."32 The Court noted the
"obvious truth" that counsel must be provided for a person who cannot
afford it to ensure a fair trial, observing that the government spends
large sums of money to prosecute crimes, and defendants who are able
to hire defense attorneys do as well.33 The "noble ideal" of the founding
fathers that every defendant will stand equal before an impartial
tribunal cannot be attained if the poorest defendants are not afforded
the opportunity to be represented by counsel.'
Quoting Justice
Sutherland, the Court closed by reflecting that every laymen needs "the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 35
Since Gideon, the Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to include representation at many pretrial proceedings
and on appeal, and, sometimes, a right to expert witnesses. 36 In
Georgia, the state constitution has included a right-to-counsel provision
since 1868. 37 This right had become "firmly entrenched" in state law
by 1874."s Georgia's constitution grants "[elvery person charged with

28. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.").
29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added) (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244).
30. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44.
33. Id. at 344.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 345 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
36. ChiefJustice'sCommission on IndigentDefense Issues Findings,GA. B.J., Feb. 2003,
at 34, 35.
37. Balcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345, 350, 138 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1964).
38. Id. at 350-51, 138 S.E.2d at 872.
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an offense against the laws of this state... the privilege and benefit of
counsel." 9
The Georgia General Assembly began addressing the federal and state
constitutional mandates in 1968 with the Georgia Criminal Justice
Act,40 which burdened each of the state's 159 counties with establishing
and funding local indigent defense programs.4 1 This county-by-county
approach led to inconsistent development of indigent defense in
Georgia.42 The next legislation addressing indigent defense was passed
eleven years later.4" The Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 1979"
created a judicial agency called the Georgia Indigent Defense Counsel
(GIDC) to dispense taxpayer funds to county indigent defense programs
and to make recommendations to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding
guidelines for operating these programs.4 5 The GIDC was supposed to
oversee the county systems at the state level, but it did not have
sufficient authority over county systems to make changes or improvements.46
In December of 2000, the Georgia Supreme Court established the
Chief Justice's Commission on Indigent Defense (the Commission) in an
47 The
effort to improve the quality of indigent defense in Georgia.
Commission worked with an independent research firm that specializes
in indigent defense to conduct research, develop a plan for improving
services in Georgia, and create a timetable for implementation of the
Commission's recommendations.46 After working for two years on this
project, the Commission delivered its report to the Georgia Supreme

GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. XIV.
40. Ga. H.R. Bill 130, Reg. Sess., 1968 Ga. Laws 999.
41. Chief Justice's Commission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings,supra note 36, at
35.
39.

42. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR
THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, PART I, 10 (2002), available at

http://www.sado.org/fees/georgia-partLl.pdf.
43.

Chief Justice'sCommission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings, supra note 36, at

35-36.
44. Ga. H.R. Bill 185, Reg. Sess., 1979 Ga. Laws 367.
45.

Chief Justice'sCommission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings, supra note 36, at

35-36.
46. See New Statewide Indigent System in Georgia, THE SPANGENBURG GRP.,
http://www.spangenberggroup.comIndigent-SystemGeorgia.htmnl (last visited Jan. 13,
2015).
47.

Chief Justice's Commission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings,supra note 36, at

34.
48. Id.; STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S
COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, PART I, supra note 42, at i.
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Court on December 12, 2002. 49 At the time, county governments
overwhelmingly funded indigent defense in Georgia; the state was only
underwriting 11.6% of the total cost.5 ° In each county, the county
government, the superior court, and the local bar association operated
the indigent defense program.5 1 There were three different systems in
place statewide.5 2 Seventy-three counties used a panel system in which
an attorney would be appointed from a panel of defense attorneys.53
Fifty-nine counties used a contract system in which a defense attorney
was paid a flat fee to represent some or all of the county's indigent
defendants. 54 Twenty counties used a public defender system with a
full-time government employee acting as public defender.55
After evaluating their research, the Commission found that Georgia's
system failed to fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide the
assistance of counsel to criminal defendants.56 It gave two main
reasons for this shortfall.57 First, Georgia was not adequately funding
the indigent defense systems in place. 58 This constitutional obligation
is imposed on the state, and therefore the state should subsidize these
legal services." s Second, Georgia needed a statewide system to oversee
public defense services statewide
that would require accountability from
indigent defense programs. 60 This conclusion had several sub-parts.6 1

49.

Chief Justice's Commission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings, supra note 36, at

34. The researchers studied reports and data about the state's indigent defense system
from a number of sources and compared Georgia's system to those in other states. See
STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION

ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, PART I, supra note 42, at i. They also selected nineteen
representative counties in which to conduct on-site evaluations of indigent defense
programs, spending over 100 days interviewing hundreds of people involved in indigent
defense services. Id. In each county, the researchers met with judges, district attorneys,
public defenders, administrators, private counsel providing indigent defense services,
county commissioners, and members of law enforcement acquainted with local indigent
defense programs. Id. Researchers also interviewed indigent defendants and recorded
their opinions about the defense services these counties provided. Id. In most counties,
the researchers also observed criminal court sessions. Id. at 1.
50. ChiefJustice's Commission on Indigent Defense Issues Findings, supra note 36, at
36.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 36-37.
58. Id. at 36.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 36-37.
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Lack of funding and oversight from the state meant that the fragmented
system in place was unable to sustain the mandate of adequate
assistance of counsel.6 2 Furthermore, no one was monitoring or
enforcing local indigent defense programs for compliance with the rules
63
that the Georgia Supreme Court had set out to govern them.
Additionally, criminal defense needed to be independent of the judiciary
as well as the local county governments; funding for indigent defense
from the counties may result in political tangles and conflicts of
interest.64 These functions could only be accomplished with funding at
the state level rather than the local level.65
The Commission also found that the systems in place had serious
deficiencies in the defense services they provided and warned that the
judiciary would need to implement reforms if the legislature did not
act. 66 For instance, lack of funding for expert witnesses and investiga7
tors often rendered existing defense services unconstitutional.
Additionally, the state needed a procedure for identifying indigent
68
defendants with mental disabilities and guidelines for their defense.
Georgia's system for representing indigent juvenile defendants was also
found lacking.69 The Commission recommended implementing a data
collection system to record information about the defense services
v
provided in the state to track progress in addressing these issues." It
concluded that a statewide public defender system would be the best
vehicle for providing effective representation."
The Commission recommended a number of steps to resolve the
problems it discovered."2 First and foremost, it proposed that the
General Assembly appropriate adequate funding to support indigent
defense.7 3 Second, it suggested reorganizing indigent defense services
to ensure constitutional representation as well as statewide accountabili74 To accomplish this
ty, uniform quality, and enforceable standards.

61. Id. at 37.
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
See id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
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goal, the Commission suggested three changes: (1) indigent defense
services should be delivered at the circuit level as opposed to the county
level; (2) a full-time public defender with adequate support staff should
be responsible for indigent defense; and (3) a statewide board should
have the power to operate the system, including the ability to hire and
fire public defenders and to define guidelines under which a public
defense panel will operate.75 The Board should also review local
systems and shoulder the responsibility of conducting training programs
for attorneys involved in indigent defense.7" The Commission also
advised the state to adopt performance standards with which to evaluate
attorneys representing indigent defendants." Furthermore, Georgia
needed to establish procedures for working with indigent defendants
with mental disabilities and with juveniles.7" Finally, the Commission
recommended that the state implement a data collection system that
would convey an accurate representation of how indigent defense
services are provided throughout the state. 79 Because making these
sweeping changes would require a significant increase in funding, the
Commission suggested establishing a transition plan to begin remedying
current shortcomings. 0
A. Southern Centerfor Human Rights Suit Against the Cordele
JudicialCircuit in 2003
In 2003, the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) sued the
Cordele Judicial Circuit alleging inadequate representation of indigent
defendants.81 The suit contended that heavy caseloads and insufficient
compensation resulted in adjudications in which indigent defendants did
not receive meaningful representation of counsel.8 2 At the time, two
part-time attorneys represented indigent defendants in the circuit."
The suit alleged that a number of indigent defendants spent months in

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

81. Second Amended Complaint, Hampton v. Forrester, No. 2003-V-118 (Crisp Cnty.
Superior Ct. 2003) (alleging that the county governments in the Cordele Judicial Circuit
failed to provide adequate funding to provide counsel for indigent defendants in the circuit,
that indigent defendants were not being informed of their rights, and that some of the
courtrooms in the jail were illegally closed to the public).
82. Id. at
84-89.
83. Id. at 5.
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8
jail before even meeting one of the contract attorneys. " The plaintiffs
asserted that the circuit's "meet 'em and plead 'em" approach meant that
the attorneys' presence merely lent an "appearance of legitimacy to the
Counsel usually met with clients just before or at
proceedings.'
arraignment, and defendants usually pled guilty after a short conversation with their attorneys about the plea offers from the prosecution.'
87
Defendants rarely had any contact with counsel beyond this setting.
Because of this structure, the defense often did not include motions
practice.8 In a particularly vivid example of the shortcomings of this
system, one named plaintiff remained in jail for four months after the
charges against him were dismissed because he did not have the9
court.8
assistance of counsel and because of the inattention of the
SCHR voluntarily dropped the suit when the public defender's office was
established. 0

B.

The Indigent Defense Act of 2003

In response to this lawsuit and the Commission's report, the General
91
Assembly passed the Indigent Defense Act of 2003 (the Act), creating
92
a public defender system in Georgia. Under the Act, funding for local
public defender offices is shared by the state and the counties in each
circuit. 93 The State funds one public defender for each judicial circuit
and "[olne assistant public defender for each superior court judge
authorized for the circuit, excluding the chief judge and senior judg95
es."94 County governments pay for additional defenders.
9
Section
The Act makes special provisions for juvenile defendants.
97
17-12-23(c) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
mandates the establishment of a juvenile division within each circuit's

84. Id. at

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

6.

65.
137.

89. Complaint, supra note 4, at 37.
90. Email from Atteeyah Hollie, Staff Attorney, S. Ctr. for Human Rights, to author
(Oct. 13, 2014, 11:00 EDT) (on file with author).
91. Ga. H.R. Bill 770, Reg. Sess., 2003 Ga. Laws 191 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
tit. 17, ch. 12 (2013 & Supp. 2014)).
92. Complaint, supra note 4, at 36.
93. Id.
94. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-27(a) (2013).
95. See O.C.G.A. § 17-12-31(a) (2013).
96. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23(aX3), (c) (2013).
97. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-2(c) (2013).
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public defender office."8
These specialists are necessary because
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23(a)(3)99 requires representation by a public defender
in "[a]ny juvenile court case where the juvenile may face a disposition
of confinement, commitment, or probation." ° ° Presumably, these
attorneys should be conversant with the unique issues that arise in
juvenile proceedings and the consequences for children who are
adjudicated delinquent.101
The status of indigent defense in Georgia has improved dramatically
in the years since this legislation was passed, but public defender offices
in some parts of the state still struggle to provide effective representa10 2
tion.
C.

Cordele Judicial Circuit's Public Defender's Office

A public defender office replaced the Cordele Judicial Circuit's contract
system in 2004 as a result of the Act. 103 At first, both the state and
the counties in the circuit funded the office.10 4 However, in 2009, the
counties in the Cordele Judicial Circuit eliminated funding for assistant
public defenders, including the attorney who was responsible for juvenile
cases. 10 5 Earlier that year, Public Defender Timothy Edison had
written a letter to the Crisp County Board of Commissioners requesting
money to hire an additional assistant public defender for the office. 106
He explained that the office was understaffed because its caseload "far
exceed[ed] what [its] standards suggest[ed]" and that he was asking each
county in the circuit to contribute to his requested budget based on the
percentage of cases from each county.107 Edison attached a "Justification Statement" to his letter in which he explained that if the county cut
funding for the one county-paid assistant public defender, the office
would be unable to "adequately] represent juvenile defendants." 8

98. Id.
99.

O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23(aX3).

100. Id.
101. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 44.
102. Bill Rankin, Landmark Ruling: Public Defender System Struggles DecadesLater,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 18, 2013, at 1A. Legal experts cite "glaring failings" that include
"meet-and-plead processing" of defendants and disparities in the quality of representation
between the judicial districts resulting from the level of funding that counties provide to
their local public defender offices. Id.
103. Complaint, supra note 4, at 38.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 37 n.1, 38-39.
106. Id. at Exhibit A.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Furthermore, Edison warned that "[wlithout the county paid assistant
public defender, th[e] office would cease to function in a manner that
would be able to adequately handle indigent representation in th[e]
county... [T]h[e] office would be subject to the same constitutional
10 9
infirmities as were alleged in regard to the old contract system."
Four months later, the position had been cut.'
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Southern Center for Human Rights Sues the Cordele Judicial
Circuit in 2014
On January 7, 2014 SCHR filed suit on behalf of eight indigent
defendants against the State of Georgia, Governor Nathan Deal, the
Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (GPDSC) and several of its
officials, officials in the Cordele Judicial Circuit, judges in the Cordele
Judicial Circuit, the public defenders in the Cordele Judicial Circuit, and
The suit
the district attorneys in the Cordele Judicial Circuit."'
alleges that the Cordele Judicial Circuit is not meeting its constitutional
mandate to provide counsel for indigent defendants in a number of
ways.112 For instance, the complaint asserts that juvenile defendants
often arrive in court to find that there is no public defender available to
represent them, that impoverished adults may be incarcerated for
months before they meet with a public defender, and that indigent
defendants in general "do not receive the most basic elements of legal
representation."1 3 The suit contends that the reason for this shortfall
is that the public defender's office in the circuit is both critically

109. Id.
110. Id. at 39. Sufficiently funding public defenders became a hot button issue at the

conclusion of Brian Nichols' trial in 2008. In 2005, Nichols killed four people-a judge, a
court reporter, a deputy, and a federal agent-during the course of a shooting spree that
began when he appeared for his rape trial. By the time his trial ended, his legal fees

exceeded $2 million. Public outrage at spending this amount of taxpayer money on public
defense, especially when the defendant had offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life
sentence, made it politically unpopular to allocate public funds for indigent defense. This

may have harmed the state's fledgling public defender system, which was still establishing
itself at the time. See generally, Rankin, supra note 101; Jury Spares Nichols a Death

Sentence, CNN (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIMEJ12/12/nichols.sentence/
index.html?eref=rsslatest.

111. Complaint, supra note 4. An amended complaint was fied on October 3, 2014.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus and First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, N.P. v. Georgia, No. 2014CV-241025 (Fulton Cnty. Superior Ct. Oct. 3,

2014) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
112. Complaint, supra note 4, at 5.
113. Id.
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underfunded and understaffed with only three full-time attorneys and
a fourth contract attorney who works a maximum of 75 hours per
month. 14 The circuit has three superior court judges and a juvenile
court judge, meaning that there are not enough public defenders to
appear in each courtroom in the circuit at any given time.115 Additionally, there is no juvenile division within the office as required by
6
O.C.G.A. § 17-2-23(c).

The Cordele Judicial Circuit has the only circuit public defender office
in the State of Georgia that does not receive county funding. 7 The
suit asserts that this problem has saddled each public defender with
excessive case loads, rendering them unable to provide meaningful
representation to their clients."8 Because of the disproportionate
number of clients to attorneys, the complaint alleges that the superior
court judges try to resolve as many cases as they can at arraignments,
despite the fact that many defendants have their initial, and perhaps
only, contact with an attorney that day." 9 At the arraignments, there
is a recess during which the public defenders can meet with defendants,
often for the first time, regarding plea offers that must be accepted
promptly. 20 Alternatively, the suit contends that judges tell defendants they may speak to the prosecutors directly about their cases, but
the judges do not warn them of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.' 2' The complaint asserts that this system does not allow public
defenders to provide meaningful representation to their clients because

114. Id.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 8. This practice means that the public defenders have violated their
statutory duty under O.C.GA. § 17-12-23(b) to begin representing indigent clients within
three business days of their arrest and application for representation. Id. at 10; see also
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23(b) (2013). The amended complaint adds a new plaintiff, James
Steverson, who had been jailed since June 3, 2014. He submitted four written requests to
the public defender's office and one written request to the district attorney's office before
a jail employee provided him with an application for assistance from the public defender's
office. A week after he submitted the application, he asked his girlfriend to follow up with
the office. The next day, a representative from the office met with Steverson briefly to fill
out a second public defender application. This representative informed Steverson that the
Ben Hill County grand jury meets in October, and Steverson probably would not go to court
before the indictment. At the time the amended complaint was filed, Steverson had been
in jail for four months, and no one from the public defender's office had interviewed him.
He did not know if the office was representing him. Amended Complaint, supra note 111,
at 17-18.
120. Complaint, supra note 4, at 8.
121. Id.
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there is no time to assess each defendant's individual case or to make
proper investigations into the merits of the case before a decision about
a plea offer must be considered and either accepted or rejected. 122
The complaint also lists myriad other ways that the public defenders
in the Cordele Judicial Circuit are not providing effective representation
to indigent defendants. Although defendants held in custody or released
on bond with restrictive conditions have the right to a preliminary
hearing, the public defenders seldom request them. 123 The lack of
support staff also means that defendants are often required to conduct
their own investigations into their cases if they choose to plead not
guilty at the arraignment."94 Perhaps most distressing, the suit also
alleges that defendants who are represented by the public defender's
office in the circuit do not know which public defender is their attorney
or if125an attorney will show up to court proceedings to represent them at
all.
These allegations of subpar representation on the part of the public
defender's office in the circuit are grim. A number of alarming stories
in the complaint about the levels of representation that the named
plaintiffs have received illustrates the situation. 2 A few are below.
1. Juvenile Plaintiffs. A.J. is thirteen years old and has been
charged in four separate cases. She requested an attorney on the day
she appeared for her arraignment, and she spoke to the public defender
present in court that day. She denied the allegations against her and
was told that she would be able to present evidence at a future court
date. No one from the public defender's office contacted A.J. in the
weeks between her arraignment and her next hearing. When A.J. and
her mother arrived at the courthouse for the hearing (they walked about
a mile), they discovered that A.J.'s case had been continued for a week
because all of the public defenders were in a different court that day.
No one from the public defender's office had informed A.J. or her mother
of the continuance, or that there would not be a public defender present
in court that day to represent her. When A.J. came back the next week
to appear in court, a public defender was present, and he advised A.J.
that the prosecutor was seeking detention time. A.J. had planned to

122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-20 to -34 (2013). The complaint incredulously
notes one incident in which the public defender asked the client to explain why the
attorney should request a preliminary hearing. Complaint, supra note 4, at 10.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 7.
126. Id. at 13-25.
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deny the charges, but she did not feel that her attorney was prepared to
defend her, so she admitted them instead. The court ordered fourteen
days of detention and twelve months of probation. A.J. was also
required to pay $50 in court fees and $50 in public defender application
fees for each of her four cases, for a total of $400. A.J. cannot pay these
fees. "27
' Although the court gave A.J. the option of serving her detention time after the Christmas holidays, she elected to begin her sentence
immediately to avoid missing school. 2 '
Seventeen-year-old WM. appeared in juvenile court charged with
shoplifting Halloween fangs worth $2.97 from Wal-Mart. Because there
was not a public defender in juvenile court that day, the judge asked
him if he wanted to go forward that day without the assistance of
counsel or if he wanted to return to court when a public defender would
be available to represent him. WM. elected to proceed without an
attorney, and he admitted to shoplifting the Halloween fangs. He was
sentenced to probation, community service, and a daily curfew, and he
must pay $2.97 in restitution."2 In his affidavit, WM. states that he
proceeded without an attorney because he did not know how long it
would take to meet with one, and he did not "want to have a case
hanging over [his] head and [he] didn't want to miss school." 3 ° He
asserts that he did not realize what an attorney does or how one could
13
help him when he made the decision to proceed unrepresented.'
WM. also stated that he did not always understand what the judge and
the attorneys were talking about during the proceedings and that he "did
not have an opportunity to say anything except to answer the judge's
questions. " 32 He further maintains that he admitted the charge
because he thought that denying the charge and requesting a hearing
would result in a longer probation sentence or incarceration. Had he
known what an attorney does, he would have requested the assistance
of counsel. 3 3
Mykenzic Phillips is sixteen years old and facing multiple felony
charges in two superior courts. The charges originated in the juvenile
courts, and Phillips was represented by a public defender at the hearing
to transfer his cases to the superior courts. However, when he went to
127. Id. at 15-18. A.J.'s family cannot afford a car, so these fees surely amount to a
hardship for her family. There is no evidence that anyone has discussed whether they can
waive this fee. See id. at 16, 17-18.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id. at 18-19.
130. Id. at Exhibit I.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the public defender's office to discuss his case after this hearing, he
discovered that he would have to reapply for counsel because his case
had been transferred to the superior court. The next time Phillips had
a hearing in juvenile court, a public defender was not present. Judge
Pack informed him that public defenders were not able to be in juvenile
court that day and gave him the option of waiting until he could speak
to an attorney or proceeding unrepresented. Phillips elected to proceed
without counsel. Judge Pack decided to transfer Phillips's remaining
juvenile cases to superior court, and she told Phillips that he was
entitled to a hearing on the transfer if he objected to her decision.
Without consulting an attorney about the purpose of the hearing or its
advantages and disadvantages, Phillips informed the court that he did
not object. Then, putting Phillips under oath, Judge Pack asked him if
he wanted to respond to the court's decision to transfer his cases.
Phillips responded by explaining what he knew about the offenses with
which he was charged. Before he could finish, Judge Pack interrupted
because it was not the appropriate time to explain mitigating circumstances. At the time the complaint was filed, Phillips's cases in superior
court were pending.1"
Fifteen-year-old A.P. was charged with battery and criminal damage
to property. She requested a public defender, and she met with the
attorney before court on the date of her first appearance. The public
defender advised A.P. of the consequences of admitting the charged
offenses. A.P. admitted to the battery charge and denied the charge for
criminal damage to property. She was sentenced for the admitted
battery, but she had to return to court for trial on the criminal damage
to property charge. After the hearing, A.P. provided her attorney with
the name of a witness who could testify on her behalf regarding the
denied charge. After that, A.P. did not hear from her public defender
again. At her next court date, the attorney did not appear, and the trial
proceeded without defense counsel. In her affidavit, A.P. states that the
judge did not give her the option of continuing the case until her
attorney could be present. Judge Pack and a probation officer questioned A.P. and her witness, and A.P. was adjudicated delinquent. The
public defender did not appear at A.P.'s restitution hearing two months
later, either. A.P. must pay $380 in restitution, $50 in court fees, and
the $50 public defender application fee for a crime of which she claims
she is innocent. In her affidavit, she wonders if her failure to pay the

134. Id. at 20-22. In the meantime, Phillips has pleaded guilty to burglary charges in
superior court, and he has been sentenced for those crimes. Amended Complaint, supra
note 111, at 16.
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public defender's application fee after her initial hearing resulted in her
attorney not attending her later court appearances. 135
Sixteen-year-old A.L., charged with terroristic threats, elected to
proceed without counsel when she arrived at court to find that there was
not a public defender present to represent her. Judge Pack informed
A.L. that if she wanted to proceed with her case that day, she could raise
her hand to ask the court questions about the proceedings or, in the
alternative, she could ask her mother. Otherwise, she would have to
return to court when a public defender would be available to represent
her. A.L. elected to proceed without counsel. She was adjudicated guilty
and ordered to perform community service, to serve probation, and to
pay a court fee.1" 6
Fifteen-year-old N.P. was charged with burglary. He has had two
hearings, and a different public defender was present at each. At the
time the complaint was filed, he had been in detention for about a
month, and he did not know which public defender represented him.1" 7
S.C. is also fifteen years old and charged with burglary. He applied
for and spoke to a public defender on the day of his arraignment in
juvenile court. The court adjudicated him delinquent and ordered that
he serve probation, perform community service, and pay $50 in court
fees as well as a $50 public defender application fee. At the time the
complaint was filed, three months after the arraignment, his restitution
hearing was still pending, and S.C. had not heard from the public
defender's office."
These plaintiffs' cases illustrate SCHR's contention that children are
often faced with the choice of continuing their hearings until a public
defender is available or proceeding unrepresented to resolve their cases
that day. 139 Children often decide to proceed without the assistance
of counsel because of the uncertainty of when an attorney will be
available in juvenile court to represent them.140 Repeatedly returning
to court is costly, and children miss school when they must appear before

135. Complaint, supra note 4, at 47, Exhibit J.
136. Id. at Exhibit K.
137. Id. at 13-14. The amended complaint follows up with the information that N.P.
spoke to a third lawyer in March 2014, who was assigned as conflict counsel. He was
adjudicated delinquent after he admitted to six of the nine counts against him. He owes
$300 in public defender application fees for the six cases. Amended Complaint, supra note
111, at 10.
138. Complaint, supra note 4, at 14-15. The date for the restitution hearing had not
been set by the time the amended complaint was filed either. Amended Complaint, supra
note 111, at 14.
139. Complaint, supra note 4, at 45.
140. Id.
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the court."' Moreover, juvenile defendants may not understand the
role an attorney would play or the disadvantages of representing themselves.142 The complaint states that there were 681 delinquency and
unruly cases filed in the circuit's juvenile courts in 2012, but the public
defenders reported only handling 52 juvenile cases that year." Since
there is an average poverty rate of 28% in the circuit, the complaint
suggests that a large percentage of children are electing to proceed
without the assistance of counsel, possibly without a full understanding
of the constitutional right they waived.'"
2. Adult Plaintiffs. The complaint also describes dire circumstances
for adult defendants in the Cordele Judicial Circuit. Richard Young,
jailed for selling cocaine, filled out a form requesting a public defender
about a week after his arrest. He did not meet his public defender until
he appeared in court for his bond hearing a few weeks later. They spoke
for a few minutes before the hearing, and the court denied bond. At the
time SCHR filed the complaint about a month later, Young had not had
45
any further contact with his public defender.'
Roderick Morgan, nineteen, was jailed and charged with a number of
counts, including two counts of burglary and one count of trespass. After
his bond hearing, where bond was set at $50,000, Morgan requested that
the public defender file a motion for bond reduction. The attorney
informed Morgan that forms for a bond reduction were available at the
jail, so he could file the motion himself. However, Morgan does not
know how to obtain the forms, and he cannot call his attorney because
calls to the public defender's office from the jail are not free. A bond
reduction has not been filed by Morgan or his attorney, and, two months
after the bond hearing, Morgan had not heard from his attorney again.
He was still in jail awaiting arraignment when the complaint was
filed. 146
Wesley Harper was charged with multiple drug felonies in August of
2013. He first met his public defender at his bond hearing, but they did
not speak before the hearing, and the attorney sat silently beside Harper
while the judge denied bond. About a month later, a public defender
met with Harper at the jail to convey the prosecution's plea offer, which

141. Id.; see also id. at Exhibit I. The parents who accompany them to court may also
be missing work, which could result in a hardship for the family.
142. Id. at 45-46.
143. Id. at 46.
144. Id. at 46 n.12.
145. Id. at 22-23.
146. Id. at 23-24.
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Harper rejected. Despite writing to the public defender's office several
times to request information about his case, a preliminary hearing, and
a reduction of bond, he has not received an answer. He remained in jail
awaiting arraignment when the complaint was filed in January
2014.147
B.

Standardsfor Representation

The complaint contends that the Georgia Supreme Court adopted
standards for limiting caseloads by full-time public defenders in 1998
and that GPDSC, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-12-8(b), 148 adopted
these standards in 2004.149 However, the complaint also states that
the GPDSC no longer claims these standards. 5 ° The GPDSC has
moved from the judicial branch to the executive branch, and the current
agency claims that this move made all prior rulemaking null and
void.' 5 ' The standards that had been adopted in 2004 were the
following:
150 Felonies (excluding those in which the death penalty is being
sought) per attorney per year, or
300 Misdemeanor Cases per attorney per year, or
250 Misdemeanor Juvenile Offender Cases per attorney per year, or
60 Juvenile Dependency Clients per attorney per year, or
250 Civil Commitment Cases per attorney per year, or
25 Appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of
Appeals per attorney per year."'
These standards were not cumulative; they were to be weighted and
applied proportionally.'53

147. Id. at 24-25.
148. O.C.G.A. 17-12-8(b) (2013).
149. Complaint, supra note 4, at 43 & n.9, Exhibit G. Exhibit G of the complaint, titled

"Standard for Limiting Case Loads and Determining the Size of Legal Staff in Circuit
Public Defender Offices," refers to paragraphs (1) and (3) of O.C.GA. § 17-12-8(b).

However, the current version of the statute does not have these subsections. See O.C.G.A.
§ 17-12-8(b). Current subsection (b) states: "The council shall approve and implement
programs, services, policies, and standards as may be necessary to fulfill the purposes and
provisions of this chapter and to comply with all applicable laws governing the rights of

indigent persons accused of violations of criminal law." Id.

150. Complaint, supra note 4, at 43.
151. Russell Gabriel, Letter to the Editor, A Public Defender with an Excessive
CaseloadCannot Assist Anyone, DAILY REP., Sept. 23, 2014, www.dailyreport.online.com

/id= 1202670911870/Letter-to-the-Editor-A-Public.Defender-with.An.Excessive.Caseload.
Cannot-Assist-Anyone?slreturn=20150220113338.
152. Complaint, supra note 4, at Exhibit G.
153. Id.
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National standards for caseloads are similar to those adopted in
Georgia. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals has adopted caseload limits of no more than "150
felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 200 mental health, or 25
appeals" per year."' Caseloads for public defenders should "reflect"
these limits; "under no circumstances" should caseloads exceed
them.'5 5 While the number of cases that an attorney can handle is
fact-sensitive, grossly exceeding these caseload standards means that
defendants are being denied the assistance of counsel-in those instances,
56
"[iut is not that there is no counsel; it is that there is no assistance."'
The three public defenders in the Cordele Judicial Circuit are handling
significantly more cases than the standards recommend.157 In 2012, the
One of the
three public defenders handled a total of 1,384 cases.
it does not
and
year,
the
of
part
for
leave
maternity
on
was
attorneys
while she
caseload
her
on
take
to
anyone
hired
office
the
that
appear
was out.'58 The other two attorneys handled 694 and 628 cases
respectively. 5 9 More than 300 of each of these attorney's cases were
felonies.16 ° This is more than double the recommended limit per year
for attorneys who are not handling anything else, and these public
defenders are also responsible for hundreds of other cases.
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Assistance of the Private Bar
In 2002, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants published Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
These principles are helpful in theory, but their successful
System.'
implementation will take a cooperative, statewide effort from the bar
association, the legislature, and the judiciary, especially when it comes
to public defender offices in poor, rural areas. For instance, the second
principle states, "Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public

A.

ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 2 n.19.
155. Id.
156. Gabriel, supra note 151.
157. Complaint, supra note 4, at 41.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 3. The title page of the document includes a
154.

caption stating, "The American Bar Association recommends that jurisdictions use these

Principles to assess promptly the needs of public defense delivery systems and clearly

communicate those needs to policy makers." Id.

800

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

defense delivery system consists of both a defender office and the active
participation of the private bar."'6 2 While this guideline makes sense
in the abstract, it ignores the practical realities of the availability of the
private bar in some rural areas. Seventy percent of the lawyers in
Georgia practice in the Atlanta area, even though only thirty-five
percent of the population lives there. 1" In Georgia, there are six
counties that do not have any attorneys at all.'6 Of the counties in
the Cordele Judicial Circuit, only Crisp and Ben Hill Counties have more
than ten lawyers, including judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and
city and county attorneys.16 5 Wilcox County has one to five lawyers,
and Dooly County has six to ten.166 Most or all of these attorneys
could be judges, prosecutors, or other lawyers who are ineligible to assist
with indigent defense.
In 2014, Chief Justice Hugh Thompson raised the disparity between
urban and rural attorney populations in his annual State of the
Judiciary Address to the Georgia General Assembly. 67 He urged both
the General Assembly and the judiciary to "take steps to correct this
imbalance."6 8 Georgia State Bar President Patrise Perkins-Hooker
has also taken up the cause, calling for increased donations to Georgia
Legal Services and proposing the Rural Lawyer Assistance Program to
encourage more attorneys to open a practice in underrepresented
counties, especially those with no lawyers at all.'69 Her goal is to
provide access to basic civil services, such as probating a will and
petitioning for guardianship, in rural communities as part of the state
bar's duty to serve the public interest. 7 ° To do so, she plans to ask
the legislature to offer debt forgiveness to law school graduates who are
willing to practice in underserved areas as part of the proposed Rural

162. Id. at 1.
163. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Rural Lawyer Shortage Concerns Leaders of the Legal
Profession, DAILY REP., Jan. 8,2015, www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202714375765/Rural.
Lawyer-Shortage-Coners-Leaders-of-the-Legal.Profession [hereinafter Tucker, Lawyer
Shortage].
164. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Here Are the Six Georgia Counties That Have No
Lawyers, DAILY REPORT, Jan. 8,2015, www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202714378330/HereAre-the-Six-Georgia-Counties-That-Have-No-Lawyers [hereinafter Tucker, Six Georgia
Counties].
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Tucker, Lawyer Shortage, supra note 163.
168. The Honorable Chief Justice Hugh P. Thompson, Ga. Supreme Court, 2014 State
of the Judiciary Address 2 (Feb. 5, 2014).
169. Patrise M. Perkins-Hooker, Our Duty to Ensure That Justice is Accessible to All,
Ga. B.J., Dec. 2014, at 4, 5; Tucker, Lawyer Shortage, supra note 163.
170. Perkins-Hooker, supra note 169, at 4.
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Areas Assistance Act.' 71 She also intends to work with local officials

7 2
to provide free office space for these practices.
The poverty level in many of these sparsely populated counties can
7
Right now,
make it challenging for an attorney to make a living.
lawyers who would like to practice in these small communities find that
there is not enough work to support a practice; local citizens often
7 4
This is where asking the
cannot afford to pay for legal services.
private bar to assist with indigent defense can help fill the gap. The
three public defenders in the Cordele Judicial Circuit currently defend
over 1,100 cases per year, and there are simply not enough private
75
However, if new
attorneys in the area to alleviate that caseload.'
attorneys move to rural areas as part of Perkins-Hooker's initiative to

bring them there, they could supplement their practices with criminal
defense work. Right now, there are not enough private attorneys in
many south Georgia counties to adequately assist the public defenders
7 6
If rural attorneys could count
with their overwhelming caseloads.
on regular state-funded criminal defense work, it would be easier to open

up a practice in impoverished areas.'77
The need for attorneys in criminal and civil matters seems to be two
sides of the same coin, and lawmakers should consider how they can
achieve solutions for both problems together. Although his address
focused mainly on the need for civil services, Chief Justice Thompson
pointed out that "we must guarantee access to justice for all people, as

171. Tucker, Lawyer Shortage, supra note 163. Similar programs are in place in
Colorado, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Kansas, Iowa, and Utah. Id.
172. See id.
173. See id.; Tucker, Six Georgia Counties, supra note 164.
174. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, If It's Friday, Fort Gaines Has a Lawyer, DAiLY REP.,
Jan. 8,2015, www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202714395232/If-Its-Friday-Fort-Gaines-Hasa-Lawyer [hereinafter Tucker, If It's Friday]. Katheryn Hayes Tucker profiled Terry
Marlowe, who lives in Fort Gaines but commutes to Albany four days a week to practice
law. He has an office in Fort Gaines that is open on Fridays, even though he usually does
not have any clients. When he does, he often performs simple legal services for no charge,
such as drafting a will for a terminally ill man. Fort Gaines is in Clay County, one of the
six counties listed in the recent report as having no attorneys at all. Id. Marlowe says
that "[t]he lack of lawyers in rural counties is in direct proportion to the lack of money in
rural counties." Id. He would practice full time in Fort Gaines or in the Pataula Circuit
if he could make a living doing so. Id.
175. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 41; Tucker, Six Georgia Counties,supra note 164.
176. See Tucker, If It's Friday, supra note 174; see also Tucker, Six Georgia Counties,
supra note 164.
177. The caseload for indigent defense has remained fairly steady in the Cordele
Judicial Circuit over the past few years, so it is reasonable to assume that these attorneys
could count on continuing criminal defense work. See Complaint, supra note 4, at Exhibits
B-D.
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our laws were not made for just a few."178 Similarly, Perkins-Hooker
focused on civil legal assistance and does not mention indigent defense
in her description of the Rural Lawyer Assistance Program, but she
clearly wants to make legal assistance available to all of Georgia's
citizens.179 Georgia's poor need both civil and criminal legal services,
and there should be a way to make both accessible in rural areas.
Increased state funding for indigent defense will be a critical aspect
of any legislation in the General Assembly to address this problem,
whether it enacts the Rural Lawyer Assistance Program or conceives of
an alternative solution. States ultimately have the responsibility to
deliver defense services, and thus they carry the burden of funding a
system that offers defense services of uniform quality statewide.'
While statewide funding for indigent defense has increased in recent
years, 81 the situation in the Cordele Judicial Circuit illustrates that
more money is needed to bring statewide uniformity to Georgia's system.
B. Accountability Courts
Chief Justice Thompson also praised the success of the statewide
network of accountability courts, calling them one of the "crowning
achievements" of recent criminal justice reform in Georgia."8 2
Access to justice also means giving those who break the law the
sentence they deserve. It means not automatically sending some
people to prison when their true crime is being addicted to drugs, or
failing to take medication for their schizophrenia, or not paying child
support because they've lost their job."S3
Across the state, counties are establishing mental health courts,
veterans' courts, drug courts, family dependency treatment courts,
juvenile drug courts, and DUI courts as an alternative to incarceration
for non-violent offenders."& These courts have a team consisting of a

178. Thompson, supra note 168, at 2.
179. See Perkins-Hooker, supra note 169, at 5.
180. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 2 ("Since the responsibility to provide

defense services rests with the state, there should be state funding and a statewide
structure responsible for ensuring uniform quality statewide.").

181. Rankin, supra note 102 ("State lawmakers have increased annual appropriations
to the defender council during a time many agencies endured budget cuts.... Moreover,
lawmakers have steadily increased the proportion of money the agency receives from a
collection mechanism set up to fimance the public defender system.").
182. Thompson, supra note 168, at 4.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also Accountability Court, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL,
http://cjcc.georgia.gov/accountability-court (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
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coordinator, a judge, a prosecutor, a defender, a member of law
enforcement, a probation officer, and a therapist to assist program
The vast majority of
participants in a non-adversarial setting."
upon graduation and
employed
are
accountability court graduates
years afterwards."
three
least
at
for
remain free of criminal charges
$20 million each
state
the
saved
have
Since their inception,187these courts
costs.
prison
in
year
Establishing one or more of these specialty courts in the Cordele
Judicial Circuit could be a way to relieve some of the burden on the
public defenders, allowing them to spend more of their time focusing on
Several counties
the cases of defendants accused of violent crimes."
felony drug
adult
near the Cordele Judicial Circuit already have
190
s9
so the
place,
in
courts" and child support problem-solving courts
can
that
accountability court model is an alternative to incarceration
have
Studies
work in rural as well as urban and suburban communities.
shown that it costs less to have offenders in accountability court
programs than in prison.19' If the poverty levels in these counties
make it problematic for indigent defendants to pay any fees associated
with participation in these programs, the money saved by putting some
non-violent offenders in accountability court rather than prison could be
re-allocated to help indigent offenders receive the benefits of these
of recidivism should also
programs.9 2 In the long run, decreased9 rates
3
reduce the overall cost of incarceration.

185. How Drug Courts Work, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.ajc.com/
see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GA.,

news/news/locallhow-drug-courts-work/nQRrZ;

STANDARDS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY COURTS 5 (2013).

186. Thompson, supra note 168, at 5.
187. Id.
188. The General Assembly has appropriated $15.3 million for the 2015 fiscal year to

fund these specialty courts, so the funding is potentially available for establishing specialty
courts in the circuit. Accountability Court, supra note 184.
189. Counties Served by an Adult Drug Court, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA,
https://georgiacourts.gov/files/Accountability%20courta/maps/Adult%20Drug%20Court.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
190. Counties Served by a Child Support ProblemSolving Court, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
GEORGIA, http://georgiacourts.gov/fles/Accountability%2Ocourts/maps/CSPS%2OCourts.Pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015).

191. See Bill Rankin & Carrie Teegardin, Drug Court: Saving Money, Saving Lives,
2012, at 1A. In 2010, an audit found that drug court

ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 5,

participation cost the state $20 a day while incarceration cost $51 a day. Id.
9
192. See, e.g. Accountability Courts,AUGUSTA GEORGIA, http://www.augustaga.gov/158
/Accountability-Courts (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (noting the monthly $125 fee to

participate in accountability court programs).
193. See Thompson, supra note 168, at 5 ("Three years after graduation, 93 percent of
all accountability court participants remain free of criminal charges.").
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C. Equal Funding for the Prosecution and Defense
The eighth of the ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
System may provide a partial solution that could be easier to implement
in the short term while larger, statewide reforms are being discussed.
This principle requires "parity between defense counsel and the
prosecution with respect to resources," allowing "defense counsel [to be]
included as an equal partner in the justice system." 9 4 This means
that the workload, salaries, and resources of the prosecution and the
public defense should be comparable.195 According to the complaint,
there are half as many public defenders as district attorneys in the
Cordele Judicial Circuit. 196 Moreover, the public defender's office only
has one investigator, and the complaint contends that the investigator's
job is simply to assist potential clients in filling out the public defender
eligibility application.' 97 By contrast, the district attorney's office has
the investigative support of local and state law enforcement agencies."19 Therefore, one solution could be to re-allocate some of the
resources currently earmarked for the district attorney's office to the
public defender's office to achieve the equality that the ABA advocates.
This could mean that the district attorney's office must reduce its staff
when some of the money is re-allocated to the local public defender's
office, an unpopular political position when voters want their elected
officials to be "tough on crime."' 99 However, studies have shown that
2.3% to 5% of prisoners in the United States are innocent. 20 0 If
defense counsel has the time and resources to advocate for these
defendants, theoretically that percentage could be reduced, and taxpayer

194. ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 3.
195. Id. Resources include "benefits, technology, facilities, legal research, support staff,
paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and experts." Id.
196. Complaint, supra note 4, at 5-6.
197. Id. at 6.
198. Id.
199. See generally, NAVL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 70 (2009), availableat
http'J/www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/upload/2012/10/139.pdf ("For some years,
there has been a national movement in the United States to get 'tough on crime.' For more
than a decade, state legislatures have joined the federal government in creating many more
mandatory sentencing and 'three-strikes' laws that have greatly increased the stakes for
the accused in criminal cases. Championing a reduction in criminal sanctions, like
championing indigent defense, is a risky move for most politicians.").
200. How many innocent people are there in prison?,INNOCENCE PROJECT, http./www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/How-many-innocent~people-are_therein-prison.php (last
visited Jan. 6, 2015).
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dollars that would have been spent incarcerating an innocent person
could be put to better use.20 1
D. ABA Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive
Workloads
In 2009, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defense followed up on the Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
System by publishing Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to
Excessive Workloads.21 2 These guidelines present methods of addressing excessive workloads so that a public defender may fulfill his or her
ethical responsibility to provide competent and diligent representation
to clients. 2 3 They put the onus on the jurisdiction's "Public Defense
Provider" to prevent excessive workloads and thus the "adverse impact
that such workloads have on providing quality legal representation to all
clients." 0 4 The Public Defense Provider in these Guidelines refers to
"public defender agencies and ... programs that furnish assigned
lawyers and contract lawyers."20 5 In Georgia, the GPDSC is the Public
Defense Provider.0 6
Upon reading the first Guideline, it is apparent that the public
defenders in the Cordele Judicial Circuit are suffering from excessive
caseloads. Indicia of excessive caseloads include the following:
Whether sufficient time is devoted to interviewing and counseling
clients;
Whether prompt interviews are conducted of detained clients and of
those who are released from custody;
Whether pretrial release of incarcerated clients is sought;
Whether representation is continuously provided by the same lawyer
from initial court appearance through trial, sentencing, or dismissal;
Whether necessary investigations are conducted;

201.

In 2010, the average cost to incarcerate an inmate per year was $21,039 in

Georgia. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE
OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 10 (2012), availableat http://www.

vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf.
202. ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS
(2009) [hereinafter ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES]. The introduction notes that the goal of
quality representation for indigent defendants espoused by the ABA "is not achievable...
when the lawyers providing the defense representation have too many cases, which
frequently occurs throughout the United States." Id. at 1.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 4.

205. Id.
206. See O.C.G.A. § 17-12-1 (2013).
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Whether formal and informal discovery from the prosecution is
pursued;
Whether sufficient legal research is undertaken;
Whether sufficient preparations are made for pretrial hearings and
trials; and
Whether sufficient preparations are made for hearings at which clients
are sentenced. 0 7
The complaint filed by the SCHR alleges incidences of each of these
indicia.20 8 These circumstances force public defenders to violate the
rules of professional conduct, which require competent representation.20 9 "Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."2 10
Excessive caseloads prevent attorneys from providing competent
representation because, while they may have the knowledge and skill
necessary to represent their clients, they do not have the time to
thoroughly prepare: they cannot perform such essential functions as
interviewing clients, engaging in motions practice, and performing
investigations, all of which are necessary to mount a defense on behalf
of the client.
Public defenders have an ethical responsibility to notify "appropriate
persons" within the public defender system when they feel that their
workload is preventing them from providing competent representation.211 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct intend for supervisors to ensure that subordinate attorneys are providing competent and
diligent service.212 If public defenders do not find relief from excessive
workloads from an immediate supervisor, the Guidelines instruct them
to report up the chain of command until relief is granted.2 3 Those in
authority, in turn, may not retaliate against an attorney who has
reported that an excessive workload has prevented the attorney from
providing competent and diligent representation.2 14
While this seems like excellent advice, this guideline does not solve the
problem at the heart of the matter-lack of state funding. If an
overburdened public defender in the Cordele Judicial Circuit reported all
the way up the chain of command to the GPDSC, the GPDSC will not

ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 4.
See Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at 39, 45-64.
See ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 4.
GA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.1.
ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 7.
212. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

213. ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 7 & n.23.

214. Id. at 7-8.
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have the funds to hire additional staff to relieve the excessive workload
because the statute requires counties to fund additional public defenders." 5 Similarly, reporting to the O.C.G.A. § 17-12-20 supervisory
panel may not afford relief, either, unless it can allocate more money to
the program. With such high poverty rates across much of south
Georgia, it seems unlikely that these counties have the ability to
appropriate sufficient funds to provide relief. Someone must have the
duty to provide relief to overburdened public defenders or the reporting
requirement does nothing more than put a number of people on notice
that poor defendants in the circuit are not being competently represented. This does not provide recourse for the overworked defender, nor does
it help indigent defendants gain the assistance to which they are
entitled. Therefore, the General Assembly should mandate the party
responsible for covering the shortfall to ensure that impoverished
defendants receive the representation the Constitution guarantees.
The last four Guidelines address what should happen after a public
defender has reported an excessive workload. The Public Defense
Provider has the burden of determining when a public defender's
workload is excessive.2 16 Providers should be monitoring workloads of
public defenders under their supervision, but concerns about overload
21 v
could also come from the attorneys or from client complaints.
However the possible overload comes to the supervisor's attention, the
supervisor must determine if the attorney's workload is preventing the
public defender from providing the competent and diligent representation espoused in the Rules of Professional Conduct.21 ' This assessment
includes evaluating the nature of the attorney's cases and how complicated they are, the lawyer's experience and strengths, the availability of
support staff and resources, and the non-representational tasks for
which the attorney is responsible.219 The supervisor may make a
"reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty" in
assessing caseloads; however, if the public defender does not believe that
the solution provided by the supervisor is reasonable, he or she has a
22 ° This might
duty to continue trying to reduce his or her caseload.

215. See O.C.G.A. § 17-12-27(a) (limiting funding to cover only one assistant public
defender per superior court judge in a circuit).
216. ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 8.

217.

See id.

218. Id.
219. Id. at 8 n.25. The availability of support staff plays an essential role in this
review; if support staff is insufficient or if staff members are also suffering under excessive
caseloads, an attorney cannot be responsible for as many cases. Id.
220. Id. at 8 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b)); see also id. at 12
("Continued representation in the face of excessive workloads imposes a mandatory duty
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include filing motions to withdraw from some cases to achieve a
workload more in line with suggested workload standards.221
1. Unavailability and Withdrawal. Some attorneys have found
success by filing a declaration of "unavailability," informing the court
and other officials that the public defender or office is not available for
new appointments at that time.222 The rationale of this declaration is
that "governments, which establish and fund providers of public defense,
never intended that the lawyers who furnish the representation would
be asked to do so if it meant violating their ethical duties pursuant to
professional conduct rules." 223 If this is not an option or does not solve
the workload problem, the attorney and the Public Defense Provider may
be required to resort to the more extreme solution in Guideline 6: filing
a motion requesting that the court stop assigning new cases as well as
withdrawing from some current cases.2"2
Filing a motion to withdraw or a declaration of unavailability is a
drastic measure for a public defender to take, but if a motion to stop
appointments is denied, an attorney will find himself in a difficult
position, forced to choose between violating the Rules of Professional
Conduct by providing inadequate representation or being 'found in
contempt of court for refusing to proceed without adequate time to
prepare. Using such motions successfully to achieve caseload relief
requires the cooperation of the judiciary. "Courts should not require
individuals or programs to accept caseloads that will lead to the
furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to the breach of
professional obligations." 225 Because a defender should only file a
motion to withdraw if prior attempts to resolve the excessive workload
have failed, these motions may be accompanied by a request to dismiss
the charges against some clients because the government has failed in
22
its constitutional duty to provide effective assistance of counsel. 1

to take corrective action in order to avoid furnishing legal services in violation of
professional conduct rules.").
221. Id. at 8 & n.28.
222. Id. at 11.

223. Id.
224. Id. at 12.
225. Id. at 14 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES, Std. 5-5.3(b) (3d ed. 1992)).
226. Id. at 12 n.42; see also NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID
& INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EXECUTIvE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SECURING
REASONABLE CASELOADS 25-26 (2012) (describing a 2008 Kentucky lawsuit in which the

Public Defense Provider asked for additional appropriations to allow the office to provide
competent service or, in the alternative, to dismiss all criminal charges).
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This request may be the only way that the overburdened public defender
can fulfill his or her ethical duty to competently represent his clients.227 However the attorney or Public Defense Provider presents the
case to the court, if they have complied with the first four Guidelines,
the court should accept the representations regarding workloads
presented. 22' The Public Defense Provider can support its case by
providing additional evidence of the excessive workload, such as
statistical data.2 29
Although it is unusual for public defenders to keep time, doing so can
supply powerful evidence that an attorney is overburdened. 23 For
instance, a timekeeping program would record the number of cases in
which public defenders could not conduct an investigation for their
clients because their time, resources, or both, were inadequate. 23 '
Over time, the program's reports could demonstrate that attorneys have
been overworked for months or years and that their caseloads need to be
adjusted accordingly.2 2 Past litigation filed by overburdened defenders has not had the benefit of this data, and this kind of hard evidence
may make a difference in the outcome of these motions.2 33
The attorney's duty of diligence imparts an obligation to appeal if the
court denies motions to halt appointments or to withdraw from pending
cases. 2m' There is a tension in this guideline, though, because of the
requirement that an attorney must continue to represent clients if a
motion to withdraw is denied, even though the attorney knows that he
cannot provide competent representation due to an excessive workload. 235 The attorney and the Public Defense Provider are also advised
to continue pursuing alternative solutions until the appeal is resolved. 236 Furthermore, the public defender is encouraged to document
his inability to provide adequate representation for the client because of

227. See ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 12.
228. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that because attorneys are officers of the

court, "when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their
declarations are virtually made under oath" and thus should be taken seriously. Id. at 13
(quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978)).
229. Id. at 12.
230. LEFSTEIN, supra note 226, at 21-22.
231. See id. at 22.
232. Id. The data that a timekeeping program would produce could be very beneficial
for a public defense program in the long run, justifying the expense of purchasing the
program and the time that the attorneys would need to commit to beth learning how to use
it and entering their time. See id.
233. See id.
234. ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 14.
235. Id. at 14-15.
236. Id. at 15.
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the excessive workload, which could also be time-consuming in a
situation where time is already scarce. 7 These notes could be used
by an appellate attorney to support an argument that a defendant was
convicted because of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, this does
not help the client in the short term; the client will likely remain
incarcerated while the case works its way through the system.
Guideline 7 addresses the concern that a judge presented with a
motion to stop the assignment of new cases and to withdraw may feel
that it is incumbent upon the court to micromanage the public defender's
office.23 Public defenders and Public Defense Providers should oppose
judicial management of public defense programs if it interferes with
their professional responsibilities to their clients. 9 To preserve the
integrity of the judicial system, defense services should remain
independent of the judiciary.' ° This does not mean, however, that
both the judge and the prosecutor should not be concerned when a public
defender reports being burdened with an excessive workload." The
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct notes the judiciary's central role in
"preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law," which should
include competent representation for both the prosecution and defense. 2 Similarly, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice impart a
duty on prosecutors "to seek justice. . . [and] to reform and improve the
administration of criminal justice."243 Thus, even though it is to the
prosecution's advantage when its opponent is overburdened and cannot
mount a competent defense, the prosecution has a higher duty to seek
justice beyond merely seeking convictions. 24 The Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct burden the prosecutor with the "responsibility of
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of

237. Id.
238. Id. at 13.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 14.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 13 n.52 (quoting ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble
(2007)). Chief Justice Thompson noted the concern that judges throughout Georgia have
expressed about the increasing number of pro se litigants in their courts: "Judges worry
not only about clogged dockets as a result of these pro se litigants, but more importantly,
about unfair trials and unjust results." Thompson, supra note 168, at 2.
243. ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 13 n.52 (alteration in original) (quoting
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS, Std. 3-1.2(c),
(d) (3d ed. 1993)).
244. See id.
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sufficient evidence."24 Thus, it may be unethical for the prosecution
to proceed knowing that a public defender has not been able to mount
a competent defense due to inadequacies in time and resources beyond
24 s
the public defender's control.
The comment to Guideline 7 notes that sometimes the public defender
does not have too many cases but merely has not had enough time to
247
For example, in Ohio, a public
prepare an adequate defense.
defender had been held in contempt of court for refusing to proceed to
2
trial with a case to which he had been appointed the same day. ' An
appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court "improperly
placed an administrative objective of controlling the court's docket above
its supervisory imperative of facilitating effective, prepared representation."2 "9 Therefore, perhaps another solution would be to reduce the
number of cases on the dockets in the various courts in the Cordele
Judicial Circuit to a volume that would allow the public defenders to
provide the representation required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct. This is not likely to be a viable long-term solution, but it
might work as a stop-gap until a more permanent fix can be achieved.
It also seems like a reasonable short-term solution in a jurisdiction in
which a sudden influx of indigent defendants temporarily overburdens
the public defender's office.
2. Other Options. Guideline 5 outlines all actions that a Public
Defense Provider can take to mitigate excessive workloads, some more
drastic than others:
Providing additional resources to assist the affected lawyers;
Curtailing new case assignments to the affected lawyers;
Reassigning new cases to different lawyers within the defense
program, with court approval, if necessary;
Arranging for some cases to be assigned to private lawyers in return
for reasonable compensation for their services;

245. GA. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt 1.
246. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS,

Std. 3-1.2 (d)("It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve
the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive
or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for

remedial action.").
247. ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 14 n.53.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5860, at *15
(Dec. 31, 2008)).
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Urging prosecutors not to initiate criminal prosecutions when civil
remedies are adequate to address conduct and public safety does not
require prosecution;
Seeking emergency resources to deal with excessive workloads or
exemptions from funding reductions;
Negotiating formal and informal arrangements with courts or other
appointing authorities respecting case assignments; and
Notifying courts or other appointing authorities that the Provider is
unavailable to accept additional appointments.2 50
These actions are only appropriate if they may be implemented as
soon as workloads become excessive or if they may be pursued when
excessive workloads are imminent but are still manageable.251 If
immediate relief is not available by these steps, either the public
defender or the Public Defense Provider should file a motion requesting
that the court stop assigning new cases and, if necessary, asking to
withdraw from some current cases. 2
Public Defense Providers should try to avoid filing suit for caseload
relief if they can. 253 Litigation will be expensive and time-consuming
without a predictable result.254 An office that is already suffering from
an excessive caseload cannot reasonably undertake additional litigation
without diverting resources away from clients. Therefore, it is critical
that the options outlined in Guideline 5 be thoroughly exhausted before
resorting to litigation. 5 Ideally, a private firm would step in to assist
the overburdened public defender pro bono, providing both the expertise
in civil litigation and additional resources that the public defender's
office lacks.25 Because that is not always an option, it is important
for public defenders to make the best possible use of the resources at
their disposal by exhausting less extreme solutions first.
Unsurprisingly, several of the proposed resolutions involve supplementing the funding for public defenders or shifting some of the
workload to the private bar.257 The ABA has long recommended that
jurisdictions employ a "mixed system" of public defense that includes the
active participation of private attorneys.5
However, the ABA acknowledges that despite its recognition that the "[g]overnment has the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 10.
See LEFSTEIN, supra note 226, at 30.
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responsibility to fund the full cost of quality legal representation for all
eligible persons," additional money may not be immediately available to
shift some of the cases to outside attorneys, rendering several of the
steps suggested impractical.259 It is not reasonable to ask outside
attorneys to represent indigent clients without compensating them-doing
a taking of property for which just compensation must be
so constitutes
260
paid.
Therefore, the comment to Guideline 5 suggests alternative solutions.6 1 Unfortunately, none of these alternatives will provide immediate relief, and some cannot be achieved by the public defender or the
Public Defense Provider; instead, the state legislature or city council
must fully participate before these suggestions can resolve the problem.
One suggestion is to limit the volume and types of cases annually
2
This
assigned to an attorney-regulated by contract or legislation.
city
or
organizations
non-profit
with
contracts
might take the form of
each
on
take
may
attorney
an
cases
ordinances that control how many
year.26 3 For example, in New Hampshire, a non-profit organization
has a contract with the state Judicial Council under which the state
public defender program notifies the courts before caseloads become
overwhelming, and the court begins appointing private attorneys
Another solution that has worked in Seattle is a city
instead.2"'
26
ordinance that limits the number of cases assigned to an attorney.
In 2009, two national studies recommended that legislatures change
the classification of certain crimes to make them civil offenses, thus
26
removing the requirement to provide counsel. 1 The cost of adjudicating misdemeanors is astounding, estimated to be at least $1000
each.26 7 Considering that any number of misdemeanants may be
innocent, this cost could easily become a drain on taxpayer dollars.
Moreover, if misdemeanants are incarcerated, it costs taxpayers an

259. See ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 10 n.35 (alteration in original)
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Std. 51.6).
260.
261.
262.

See id.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 10.

263. Id. at 10 n.37.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 11.
267. Robert C. Boruchowitz, Gideon's Promise and Peril: Meeting the Mandate for
Indigent Defense-Development of Standards in Washington State (Oct. 11, 2013)
(powerpoint availableat http://www.americanbar.orgcontent/dam/aba/events/legal-aid-in
digent-defendants/2014/ssclaid_2eboruchowitz_harvardpanel.authcheckdam.pdf).
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average of $80 per day.268 By reclassifying victimless crimes, such as
possession of marijuana, as non-criminal violations, the legislature could
potentially save the state millions of dollars that could be allocated
instead to public defender offices desperately in need of additional
funding. 26s The downside of this solution is that while it would remove
the burden of representing certain clients from the public defense
system, the defendants in these situations may actually feel they are in
a worse predicament; instead of having even unsatisfactory representation of counsel, these defendants would find themselves without the
"guiding hand of counsel" at all. Even so, on balance, this seems like a
reasonable place to consider reallocating scarce resources.
E.

Client Selection of Counsel

In other countries, indigent defendants have the opportunity to choose
their own counsel.2 7 ° This system ensures the independence of public
defenders from the judiciary and incentivizes attorneys to serve the best
interests of their clients by providing high-quality representation.2 7 1
This arrangement puts public defenders on equal footing with private
defense attorneys: satisfied clients recommend their attorneys to family
and friends, thus generating future business for defense attorneys. 272
In Scotland, the public defenders requested that the indigent defense
system be modified to allow clients to select their attorney because it
enhances a client's trust and the loyalty of the attorney.273
V.

CONCLUSION

"Most of us grew up saying the Pledge of Allegiance at school, in which
we promised 'liberty and justice for all.' I don't believe we ever meant,
'liberty and justice only for those who can afford it."2 74 Granting
indigent defendants their constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel is a complex problem, and implementing necessary reforms will
require the joint efforts and co-operation of all three branches of
government.275 First and foremost, the Georgia General Assembly

268. Id.
269. See id.
270. LEFSTEIN, supra note 226, at 32. This system is in place in Australia, Canada,
England, New Zealand, and Scotland. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.

274. Thompson, supra note 168, at 1.
275. See id.("As Georgia continues to grow in population and diversity, access to justice
is a challenge requiring the commitment and hard work of us all.").
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must explore ways in which it can increase funding for public defenders
in poor counties without the ability to hire additional public defenders.
In these areas, the need for indigent defense is the greatest and the
resources are the scarcest. Because it is the state's responsibility to
provide counsel for criminal defendants in need, the solution must come
7
at the state level. ' The good news is that Chief Justice Thompson
raised access to justice for indigents as a critical issue facing the state
when he spoke to the General Assembly last year. As lawmakers work
to address increasing access to civil legal services for the state's poor,
they should also consider ways they can provide caseload relief for public
defenders as part of the solution.
In the meantime, county and state officials should look at alternative,
short-term solutions to immediately relieve the heavy caseload under
which public defenders in the Cordele Judicial Circuit are laboring,
whether it be reallocating some resources or reclassifying some
victimless crimes. Even the most dedicated public defenders can only do
so much for their clients when they must take on over 500 cases per
year.2' This is not the competent, meaningful representation promised by the federal and state constitutions and guaranteed by the United
States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainright more than fifty years ago.
Reform is necessary to prevent constitutional violations.
LESLEY RowE

276. See ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 2 ("Since the responsibility to provide
defense services rests with the state, there should be state funding and a statewide
structure responsible for ensuring uniform quality statewide.").
277. See Complaint, supra note 4, at Exhibit D.

